Abstract-The use of synchrophasor networks consisting of phasor measurement units (PMUs) makes it possible to monitor, analyzes, and control the electric power grid in real-time. PMU measurements of frequencies, currents, voltages, and phase angles are transmitted to system control centers through synchrophasor networks. Delayed or missing measurements from PMUs in closedloop applications could lead to power system instability. Although the use of virtual private network (VPN) tunnels eliminates many security vulnerabilities, VPNs are still vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attack that exploits a side-channel vulnerability. In this paper, the authors detail their analysis of DoS attack on a two-area four machine power system with a utility-scale photovoltaic (PV) plant. Automatic generation control (AGC) is used to implement a tie-line bias control in one of the areas. The impact of PMU packet dropping on AGC operation and countermeasures are presented in this paper. Cellular computational network (CCN) prediction of PMU data is used to implement a virtual synchrophasor network (VSN). The data from VSN is used by the AGC when the PMU packets are disrupted by DoS attacks. Real-time experimental results show the CCN based VSN effectively inferred the missing data and mitigated the negative impacts of DoS attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A SYNCHROPHASOR network consists of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs). PMUs are used in real-time monitoring, analysis and control of power systems, whereas PDCs receive and timesynchronize data from multiple PMUs to provide time-aligned output streams. The increasing penetration of renewable energy sources such as Photovoltaics (PV) into the electric grid has advantages as well as disadvantages, specifically solar irradiance variability and uncertainty [1] , [2] . The integration of renewable energy generation into the grid requires monitoring and the use of advanced control techniques [3] , [4] . The deployment of PMUs, however, can improve grid management to mitigate the challenges of integrating renewable energy sources.
Unlike the conventional studies involving power systems security, the subject of this study involves the security of smart grid synchronous networks (PMUs, PDCs, computers and communication systems), more commonly known as the cyber-security of smart grids [5] , [6] .
Concerns about the dependability and security of the communications infrastructure are affecting the adoption of synchrophasor technology, making it all the more essential to secure the network connections between PMUs and PDCs to ensure the reliability of smart grid operations [7] , [8] . Although many vulnerabilities can be eliminated by encrypting the traffic using security gateways, the encrypted traffic remains vulnerable to side-channel analysis [9] . Side-channel analysis extracts information by observing implementation artifacts. In previous studies, where multiple PMUs transmit measurement packets through a VPN tunnel, packet size and inter-packet timing side-channels are used to differentiate packet sources [10] . This technique can be exploited to identify and selectively drop PMU traffic. When real-time PMU data is used for control, these attacks can cause the power system to become unstable.
In this paper, the impact and mitigation of a DoS attack on tieline bias control in a two area system are presented, followed by a description of the experiments performed in a simulated twoarea four machine power system with a utility-scale PV plant. This paper details the creation and implementation of a Cellular Computational Network (CCN) [11] based Virtual Synchrophasor Network (VSN) for Automatic Generation Control (AGC), with the objective of mitigating the impact of PV power generation fluctuations and other disturbances on system frequencies. The topology of the VSN matches the topology of the power system, which means that during a DoS attack, missing PMU data can be inferred using the VSN. To illustrate the possible impact, a three phase-to-ground fault occurs in the power system while one PMU is blocked. The attack is performed based on side-channel analysis of PMU traffic in a VPN tunnel [10] . The main contributions of this paper are:
1) DoS attack that exploits a side-channel vulnerability on tie-line bias control are investigated and consequences outlined. 2) Countermeasures against these DoS attacks using CCN based VSN are developed and shown to be most effective. 3) Real-time DoS attacks and VSN countermeasures are performed. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the power system used in this study. Section III explains the side-channel analysis and attack scenarios. Section IV introduces the CCN. Section V describes two countermeasures to mitigate DoS attacks. Section VI presents the experiments, results and analysis. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VII.
II. TWO AREA FOUR MACHINE POWER SYSTEM WITH
UTILITY-SCALE PV PLANT AND PMUS Fig. 1 shows the two-area four machine power system used in this study with each area having two synchronous generators, and with each rated at 900 MVA. A 210 MW utilityscale PV plant is integrated into Area 2. With the variable PV power generation in Area 2, there is a dynamic tie-line power flow from Area 1 to Area 2. Generator rated values and power outputs used in this study are shown in Table A.1. Each area has an AGC implemented. The AGC in Area 1 (AGC 1) a diagram of which is detailed in Fig. 2 is implemented with tieline bias control. PMU measured PV power output and Area 1 frequency values are passed as inputs to AGC 1, which decides the Area 1 generation by minimizing area control error. Tie-line power flow is regulated to optimally utilize the PV power generation in Area 1. Table A. 2 shows the parameters of AGCs used in this study. PMUs are placed at each power system Bus.
A dedicated communication synchrophasor network is used to transmit PMU measurement data, the configuration of which is shown in Fig. 1 . There are four secured subnets connected by a dedicated network with a security gateway protecting each secured subnet. The attack described in this paper has been found to be robust to issues related to network traffic interactions and topologies [12] , [13] . For ease of presentation, simplified network is used for this study.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels are established between each of the security gateways with traffic transmitted through VPN tunnels is encrypted by the security gateway, including the source and destination addresses. A system PDC is located at the control center subnet collecting data from PMUs located at Area 1 and the tie line subnet and an area PDC located at Area 2 subnet. The PMUs located at Area 2 are sending measurement data to the Area PDC. Synchronized measurement data from multiple PMUs are aligned by the system PDC and used for AGC operation.
The above model is implemented on the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) [14] facility at the Real-Time Power and Intelligent Systems (RTPIS) Lab [15] at Clemson University. The power system is simulated on RTDS, and data used for the power system control is collected using hardware PMUs.
III. SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS OF PMU TRAFFIC
Although the encryption systems are mathematically difficult to crack, but the physical implementation of cryptographic systems leak information. For example, the power consumption of a computer is correlated to different operations. By monitoring power consumption, the activities of a program can be inferred [16] . For network enabled programs, it is possible to infer program operations by analyzing the network traffic. In [17] , a timing side-channel vulnerability of SSH has been used to extract the system password from interactive sessions.
A VPN is a tunneled, and encrypted connection established between two private networks though public network. Packets transferred through a VPN tunnel have the same source and destination IP. The real source and destination IPs for each packet are encrypted and can not be seen by the third party. Fig. 3(a) shows a VPN tunnel that connects two private networks, multiple traffic streams are transmitted though the tunnel including two PMU measurement data streams.
In [10] , PMU measurement sessions are detected even when all packets are encrypted in a VPN tunnel. Furthermore, packet size side-channels and inter-packet timing side-channels can differentiate between the sources of PMU packets when multiple PMU data streams are transmitted in a single encrypted VPN tunnel. In this case, an encrypted VPN tunnel is established between two subnets. Multiple PMUs in one subnet are connected to a PDC on the other subnet through this encrypted VPN tunnel. Mapping the encrypted packets to PMUs based on inspect the content of each packet is impossible. However, by using sidechannel analysis, the most probable mapping between packets and PMUs can be identified and a specific PMU data stream can be blocked by an attacker without interfering with other traffic in the same VPN tunnel, shown as Fig. 3(b) . This attack is easy to perform but difficult to diagnose. The attack only identifies and blocks the PMU data transmission stream. Other traffic from PMUs e.g. PING or HTTP is not blocked, thus making the PMU appear to be connected to the network while not transmitting any data. 
A. Security Gateways
Security gateways establish VPN tunnels between private networks through public network. Security gateways encrypt and decrypt network packets with little overhead. The use of security gateways can reduce the risk and cost of sending critical information securely through a long distance network. In smart grid communication networks, security gateways are deployed at critical locations to provide secured communication methods.
Security gateways use Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocols to secure Internet Protocol (IP) communications. IPsec protocols provide an industrial standard security scheme to ensure communication and interoperation. The use of security gateways eliminates many vulnerabilities such as packet sniffing, data spoofing, malicious code injection, and replay attacks [9] . IPsec protocols mainly provide authentication, verification and confidentiality. Authentication ensures the data is from where it claims to be, verification checks whether the received data has been altered, and confidentiality ensures the data been transferred is not visible to third parties [18] . Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA or 3DES) are commonly used for encryption. The authentication and encryption methods make it practically impossible to decrypt and modify an encrypted packet without proper keys. Fig. 4 demonstrates the process that encrypts a PMU measurement package by a security gateway.
The security gateway quickly encrypts each packet and barely alters the timing features of the original traffic. Similarly, the packet size of encrypted packets is correlated to the size of the original packets. By analyzing the packet streams rather than looking at a specific packet, additional information can be inferred.
B. Packet Size Side-Channel
The size of PMU measurement packets from the same PMU remain constant unless the configuration is changed or a retransmission of previously missed packets. Different PMU models have different capabilities and different default configurations, thus making it easy to map the packet size to PMU models, the size of which is expressed as (1) .
Where 'S P M U ' is the length of a PMU measurement packet, '54' is the byte size of the header, 'n' is the integer number of data frames contained in a packet, and 'S D AT A ' is the length of synchrophasor data frame. Although 'S D AT A ' is usually different for various PMU models, for the same PMU model, 'S D AT A ' remains constant unless the configuration is changed.
In most cases, each PMU packet contains one synchrophasor data frame (n = 1). In a TCP connection, when a packet is not received within a predefined window, the PMU is notified and attaches the missing data frame(s) in the subsequent packet, at which point the following packet will include multiple synchrophasor data frames (n ≥ 2). According to observed data, the value of 'n' is usually between 1 and 10.
In a VPN tunnel, the relation between clear-text packet size and cypher-text packet size can be expressed as (2) .
Where S cypher is the size of the cypher-text packet, 54 is the byte size of the new header and S clear is the size of clear-text packet. Using 2, the size of encrypted (clear-text) packet can be inferred by the size of clear-text (encrypted packet).
Thus, a mapping relation between clear-text PMU packet sizes, cypher-text packet sizes and PMU model numbers can be built.
The packet size relation between a clear text PMU measurement packet and an encrypted PMU measurement packet is shown as Fig. 4 .
C. Inter-Packet Timing Side-Channel
The timing pattern of PMU measurement traffic remains constant unless the network connection is changed. The PMU measurement traffic observed in RTPIS Lab from different PMU models has the same pattern. Thus, the inter-packet timing sidechannel can be used to separate traffic into several streams, where multiple PMU measurement traffic streams are transferred within one VPN tunnel. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is then used to determine whether the extracted stream contains a single PMU measurement traffic stream [10] . Streams that accepted by the HMM are identified as PMU measurement traffic.
The HMM construction algorithm that infers the HMM structure and state transition probabilities from a sequence of symbolized observations has been extensively studied and can be found in [12] , [19] . The HMM inference approach is shown in Fig. 5 , and the histograms of inter-packet timing for each of the PMUs in RTPIS Lab are shown as Fig. 6 . The assignment of labels according to the distribution permits the labeling of PMU packets based on the delta time. The HMM built from the symbolized PMU data sequence in VPN tunnel is given in Fig. 7 .
D. PMU Traffic Separation Algorithm
By using packet size and timing side-channels, PMU measurement traffic streams can be identified and differentiated from within a VPN tunnel. In a dedicated VPN tunnel, one or more PMU measurement traffic streams can be transferred. The timing side-channel and packet size side-channel for each PMU stream stays consistent. By using packet size side-channels, PMU streams that are not of interest can be ignored. Based on the histogram of PMU traffic, shown as Fig. 6 , a normalized evaluation map of observed delta time for each symbol can be calculated, shown as Fig. 8 . For each observed packet, delta times from previously received packets can also be calculated, and evaluations can be made based on the evaluation map. Unless more than one PMU is sending packets almost simultaneously, it is relatively easy to differentiate between different PMU streams. A recursive greedy algorithm is used to separate the traffic [10] . The HMM described in Section III-C is used to check the separated stream. A flowchart of the packet separation algorithm is given in Fig. 9 .
E. DoS Attack on PMU Measurement Traffic
The system PDC collects measurements from PMUs and Area 2 PDC and send aligned data to the control center for AGC. The time stamp information in each measurement packet is then used for data alignment. In OpenPDC, an open source PDC software [20] , a parameter called 'Lag Time' is used to determine the amount of time to required for the arrival of all the data for a particular time frame to arrive. If measurement packets are expected but not received within the time window, OpenPDC will send only the received data to the system PDC. Missing data positions are filled in order to keep the format of the aligned data packet constant. A flag in the aligned data packet indicates the data is invalid [21] . The filler is often a string of zeros, which means without any countermeasures, using value zero for AGC is harmful to the operation of the power system. The attacker's goal then becomes that of subverting the power grid by stealthily halting the PMU that monitors Bus 7 ( Fig. 1 ) from sending measurement data to the control center. Either simply cutting the wire or blocking all encrypted traffic can be quickly diagnosed. Side-channel analysis and selectively dropping measurement packets from the target PMU is a more effective attack. Assume one node between the security gateways has been subverted by an attacker, as shown in the Wireshark screen in Fig. 1 . The attacker performs a Man-In-The-Middle attack, then takes over the connections to the system PDC and carries out a side-channel analysis attack, during which the attacker drops all measurement data from one PMU without interrupting the connection [10] . When the PMU measurement packets are not delivered within an expected window, the PDC will send zeros to the control center for AGC. The lack of countermeasures means that AGC 1 keeps using zero as input that quickly leads to the power system instability.
The attack approach has been tested in environments with large amounts of extraneous traffic and shown to be resilient and thus not focused in this study [12] , [13] . In this study, a simplified dedicated network is considered, shown as Fig. 1 with PMU 7 selected as the target. Data measurement traffic from PMU 7 can be identified and blocked by the attacker in a three-step process. The IP pair of interested security gateways is first identified. The packets that do not agree with the packet size side-channel are then ignored, and followed by the use of timing side-channels to identify and block packets from one PMU.
1) In
Step One, the IP Addresses of Interested Security Gateways are Identified: Wireshark software is used to interpret the protocol of each packet so that security gateways send encrypted packets frequently and stably. Wireshark recognizes IP pairs that are sending and receiving encrypted packets, and three IPs are identified as the security gateways sending PMU measurements. In this study, each PMU transmits 30 packets per second (30 Hz PMU rate). For three PMUs, 90 packets are transmitted from the security gateway. According to network configuration shown in Fig. 1 , Area 1 subnet has 5 PMUs transmitting 150 packets per second; the Area 2 subnet has 6 PMUs transmitting 180 aligned packets per second; and the tie-line subnet has a single one PMU transmitting 30 packets per second. By validate the number of packets transmitted per second as well as packet size, the IP of the security gateway securing the Area 1 subnet is identified.
2) In
Step Two, the PMUs are Identified by Packet Size SideChannels: PMU 6 and PMU 7 is the same model with the packet size the same as the default setting. PMU 1, 2 and 5 are all different PMU models with the packet sizes differing from PMU 6 and PMU 7. A packet size filter is used to ignore PMU 1, 2 and 5.
3) In
Step Three, the PMU Packets are Selectively Dropped: Using the concept described in Section III-D, two PMU measurement streams are differentiated. However, the separation algorithm cannot identify which stream originates from PMU 6 and which originates from PMU 7. The attacker can randomly pick a PMU measurement stream and drop all packets from that stream. In the analysis, only the results from blocking PMU 7 are presented.
IV. CELLULAR COMPUTATIONAL NETWORK
CCN is a scalable and distributed framework for predicting/estimating the dynamics of large networked systems [11] , [22] . A CCN can be expressed as a directed graph. Fig. 10 shows an example CCN topology. Each of the nodes in a CCN is a computational cell, shown as the square boxes in Fig. 10 . Each cell consists of a computational unit, a learning unit, and a communication unit. Each cell takes an input vector and calculates an output in one time step. Cells can learn to generate desired output using historical data. The output estimated by each cell can be passed to other connected cells as input(s) for further computation. A cell can provide more accurate outputs from the information provided by interconnected cells, which can be deployed either on a single computer or multiple computers connected through a network. The type of the computational unit in a cell depends upon the application, with the goal of predicting/estimating the required output using the available information. A cell has the ability to learn autonomously, for example computational intelligence (CI) paradigms such as neural networks and fuzzy systems.
The advantage of CCN is that the topology of a CCN can be designed to match the topology of the objective power system, permitting the deployment of the cell to local systems. CCN is an appropriate scalable computational framework to learn and predict/estimate the behavior of a power system, the topology of which can be mapped to a CCN, where the Buses of the power system can be simulated by cells. Cells can be learned to follow the characteristics of each component/Bus, and for each cell, predictions can be made based on information gathered from adjacent connected cells. By carefully designing a CCN that matches the topology of the objective power system, it is possible to make predictions based on the dynamics of the power system. In [23] , dynamic state estimation (DSE) of a power system can be made by the CCN even if multiple PMUs' data is missing.
When the information of a part of the objective power system is not available, the missing information can be estimated using CCN. Power systems must be closely monitored during unexpected situations such as security attacks; CCN can provide a better situational awareness/intelligence for power system operation and control.
In this study, a CCN based VSN architecture is implemented for the two-area four machine power system by mapping each Bus of the system (Fig. 1) indicates a single time step delay that occurs with the acquisition of data from neighboring cells. Each cell in the CCN includes an extreme learning machine (ELM) as the computational unit. ELM is a type of single hidden layer feedforward network, where the input to hidden layer weights is assigned randomly. In an ELM, input to hidden layer weights are kept consistent during the learning process. Thus, ELM is extremely fast in learning input-output mapping [2] . ELM is more suitable for non-linear time series predictions. Specifically, if a PMU is attacked, the communication capability with adjacent connected Buses aids each cell to provide accurate predictions at which point the missing data values are estimated by a VSN and used for the AGC operation. ELM based CCN frequency prediction approach for two-area four-machine power system is presented in [24] , which clearly explains the development and application of ELM including its training and testing methods used in this study.
V. AGC OPERATION UNDER ATTACK
In this study, PMU 7 located at Bus 7 ( Fig. 1) , is used to provide frequency measurement to the AGC in Area 1, which is subjected to attack. Fig. 11 shows the flowchart for the test cases. From each time stamp t, the PMU packet receiver waits Δt time till a packet arrives. At time t + Δt a flag status is checked and different test cases are followed based on the status of the flag. If a packet has arrived before t + Δt, the flag is set to 0, and the received value is used for AGC control. To study the consequence of PMU packet dropping without any countermeasure, the flag is set to 0, and the frequency value 0 is sent to the AGC if a PMU packet is not received until t + Δt. To study the effect of countermeasures, if the packet is not received on time, the flag status is set to either 1 or 2, and a countermeasure is implemented to replace the missing data. There are two types of countermeasures, A and B. Countermeasure A uses the last received data to replace the missing data, and Countermeasure B uses the CCN based VSN estimated data to replace the missing data.
The two countermeasure approaches are implemented and deployed on a computer in which OpenPDC is installed at the Fig. 11 . The flowchart for AGC operations under DoS attacks. This includes four possible cases studied: 1) packet arrived before t + Δt and used for AGC; 2) packet did not arrive before t + Δt and value '0' is used for AGC; 3) packet did not arrive before t + Δt and last arrived value is used for AGC; 4) packet did not arrive before t + Δt and VSN estimated value is used for AGC. control center. Fig. 2 shows the AGC switching behavior based on the frequency input value of the flag.
A. Countermeasure A
For Bus i, the last received data f i (t) at time t is sent to replace the missing data at time t + Δt. If the system keeps missing data over multiple continuous time intervals, then the data received at time t is sent to AGC continuously until the flag status changes.
B. Countermeasure B
For Bus i, VSN predicted frequencyf i (t + Δt) is used to replace the missing data at time t + Δt. Similar to Countermeasure A, if the system continues to missing data for multiple continuous time intervals, the VSN predicted frequency valuê f i (t + 2Δt) based on previously predicted frequency valuê f i (t + Δt) is used for AGC.
1) Single Time
Step Predictions: The input vector for cell i is given by (3)
where f i (t) is measured i th Bus frequency at time t,f j (t) is the predicted j th Bus frequency at time t, f j (t − Δt) is measured j th Bus frequency at t − Δt, j represents all the neighboring Buses, and Δt is the prediction time step. In this study Δt is 33 ms.
The output of cell i is the predicted frequencyf i (t + Δt) at time t + Δt.
For example, the input for frequency prediction at cell 7 at time t + Δt is using Bus 7 historical frequency values and neighboring Buses historical frequency values as given by (4) .
The output of cell 7, which is the predicted frequency datâ f 7 (t + Δt) at time t + Δt, is calculated according to (5)
where W in and W out are the respective input and output weights of the ELM. The sigmoid function is used as the activation function. Fig. 12 shows the single time step ahead (33 ms) frequency prediction results obtained for the frequency at Bus 7 with PV power variability.
2) Recursive Frequency Predictions:
If the system keeps missing data packets for multiple Δt time intervals, VSN recursively uses its predicted values in input function. Fig. 13 shows an example of recursive VSN prediction procedure for Bus 7 for two consecutive Δt time intervals. The data from PMU 7 at time t + Δt and t + 2Δt are not delivered on time. Please note that at time t + Δt, data from neighboring PMUs are delivered and used for prediction at time t + 2Δt. 
VI. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS ANALYSIS

A. Experimental Setup
All experiments and measurements are carried out in the RT-PIS Lab in Clemson University. The PV plant is simulated using real-time weather data from Clemson, SC, and the hardware security gateways are configured to encrypt and decrypt packets between the hardware PMUs and OpenPDCs. Wireshark [25] (a network protocol analyzer software) is used to collect data packets, and the DoS attacks are performed between hardware security gateways.
In the RTPIS Lab, the real-time synchrophasor test bed is used for this study. Capable of integration with hardware equipment, RTDS is a simulation system that simulates power system operations in real-time. In this study, the real-time solar irradiance measured within the RTPIS Lab is used to calculate the PV power in real-time. All the test cases are carried out when the PV power generation is 88 MW and the corresponding generator power outputs are given in Table A.1. The effect of solar irradiance variability and uncertainty in AGC is presented in [2] . In this paper, variable solar irradiance is not considered for the benefit of comparison of test cases. Twelve Hardware PMUs are used to observe simulated measurement data from RTDS with each hardware PMU configured to monitoring the frequency, voltage and current of a Bus in the two-area four machine system, as shown as Fig. 1 . Hardware PMUs transfer measurement data to OpenPDCs through the Clemson campus network, and the connections are encrypted with hardware security gateways, also shown in Fig. 1 . The system PDC sends aligned measurement data back to RTDS through Ethernet connection, with the input from system PDC is configured for AGC control in the simulated power grid.
To observe the more obvious results, a fault is applied to the power system immediately after the DoS attacks are performed. A three phase-to-ground 'fault' at Bus 8 for ten cycles is implemented for each experiment. This simulates a trip of a tie-line.
The DoS attacks randomly pick either PMU 6 or PMU 7 to block. To simplify the result analysis, only the results are presented where PMU 7 is blocked. For Countermeasure A, the frequency used by the AGC depends on the last frequency received at the beginning of the attack started, which can be varied in each experiment. Two cases are analyzed for Countermeasure A, hereafter referred to as 'Case 1' and 'Case 2'. In Case 1, the last frequency received is 60.2 Hz, and in Case 2, the last frequency received is 59.8 Hz. The experimental results under different disturbances as well as the effectiveness of VSN are presented in this section.
B. Consequences and Countermeasures of DoS Attacks 1) Fault and Attack Without Countermeasure:
The response of the two-area four machine power system after a three-phase to ground fault at Bus 8 for ten cycles with a DoS attack blocking one, five, and 100 measurement packets from PMU 7 are presented in Figs. A.1, A.2 and A.3, respectively. 2) Fault and Attack With Countermeasure A deployed: The response of the two-area four machine power system, where Countermeasure A is deployed, after a three-phase to ground fault at Bus 8 for ten cycles with a DoS attack blocking 5 and 300 measurement packets from PMU 7 are presented in Figs. A.4 and A.5, respectively.
3) Fault and Attack With Countermeasure B Deployed: The response of the two-area four machine power system, where Countermeasure B is deployed, after a three-phase to ground fault at Bus 8 for ten cycles with a DoS attack blocking 5 and 300 measurement packets from PMU 7 are presented in Figs. A.6 and A.7, respectively.
C. Analysis
The consequences and countermeasures are evaluated from the perspective of system stability and the energy change according to expected energy to be delivered or generated.
The difference of the energy either delivered or generated that expected in a one minute window after a fault under each scenario is calculated by:
Where P (t) is the power measured at the tie-line or generators in each cases, and P E is the expected power either delivered or generated. The results are shown in Table A.3 and Fig. 14. 
1) Without any Countermeasures:
The absence of one to five packets will affected the power generation and the tie-line flow. The energy delivered on the tie-line also increased dramatically as more packets are been blocked. The absence of five or more packets caused a forced oscillation on the power generation and tie-line flow. The absence of 100 or more packets results in system instability.
2) Countermeasure A: The use of old frequency data to replace the missing measurement data stabilized the power system, and no forced oscillation in power generation and tie-line power flow is observed. However, the occurrence of a DoS attack at a very high system frequency of 60.2 Hz deceived the AGC in Area 1 which reduced the power generation in Area 1. To mitigate this power loss, the power generation at Area 2 is increased. Similarly, the AGC in Area 1 is again deceived by a very low system frequency of 59.8 Hz, which in this case increased the power generation in Area 1. The power delivered on tie-line is increased, and power generated in Area 2 is reduced. Although not experimentally observed, this increase in power either delivered or generated can trip the tie-line or synchronous generators.
3) Countermeasure B: The use of CCN predicted frequency data to replace the missing measurement data showed no obvious effects on power system operation, power generation and tie-line flow.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this study, the CCN is used to develop a VSN that estimate the missing data during DoS attacks. The ability to accurately estimate the frequency change trends during the DoS attack makes it possible to deliver the results demonstrated in this study.
The VSN provides an innovative solution for adopting PMU measurement data for closed-loop control. The VSN is realized using a cellular computational network to predict frequency at the power system buses when real-time data is not available. The real-time implementation of DoS attacks and mitigation of damage using VSN validated the effectiveness of the proposed method for frequency prediction.
In this study, the consequences of DoS attacks that exploits a side-channel vulnerability in a synchrophasor network has been demonstrated. The lack of countermeasures greatly increases the expense of lost PMU measurement packets during system operation. Results indicated that the lack of additional countermeasures can render the synchrophasor networks vulnerable to a DoS attack, even if the network communications have been encrypted with security gateways. A countermeasure that simply uses last received data is found ineffective in mitigating damage especially the change of energy delivered or generated during a severe event.
The original intention in deploying synchrophasor devices is for reducing the system operation cost while increasing both revenue and service quality. However, the cost of a guaranteed delivery of real-time PMU measurement data is expensive. According to the results presented in this study, the CCN based VSN prediction is validated as a practical solution that effectively reduces both the cost and risk of adopting PMU in closed-loop applications. Also, this proposed CCN based VSN can increase the resiliency of power system operations to DoS attacks, thus enhancing the reliability with variable generation systems (e.g. large solar farm integrated power system). This novel VSN technology in turn makes it possible to minimize the penalties from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Further study shall be performed to evaluate the reliability improvement by applying the proposed VSN to smart grid operations [26] . 
APPENDIX
